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A wave of political upheaval surrounding responses to globalization has struck many Western 
political systems in recent years. Populist leaders and parties have risen in prominence, with 
opposition to immigration central to these movements (Shehaj et al., 2019). The Leave vote in the 
Brexit referendum in the UK has similarly been shown to have been fueled in large part by 
concerns about immigration (Clery et al., 2017; Langella and Manning, 2016; Meleady et al., 
2017). With such far-reaching political implications, understanding the nature and origins of 
immigration attitudes is increasingly important. 
Some research argues that economic conditions are key to predicting anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g., 
Kuntz et al., 2017; Rodrik, 2018). However, Hainmueller and Hopkins’ (2014) review of the 
literature shows that sociotropic concerns, not personal economic circumstances, are most 
influential, and cultural rather than economic concerns tend to motivate immigration attitudes. 
Thus, many scholars have focused on identifying the individual attributes that affect sensitivity to 
intergroup threats, highlighting the importance of ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘social dominance 
orientation’ (SDO) (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt and Sibley, 2007). In particular, these traits are shown 
to influence which types of group prejudices are observed (Asbrock et al., 2010; Duckitt, 2006), 
as well as the types of outgroup threats that are most salient (Asbrock et al., 2012).  
 
Here, we draw on the research on authoritarian values and theories of intergroup threat to examine 
how these factors are associated with attitudes toward immigration. Cultural threats are central in 
shaping attitudes towards immigration (McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007).  
Individuals high on the measure of ‘right-wing authoritarianism’ (RWA) — who value group 
norms, cohesion, and stability (Duckitt, 1989) — emphasize protecting the ingroup from perceived 
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cultural threats (Duckett, 1989; Feldman, 2003; Feldman and Stenner, 1997). Building on these 
literatures, we argue that a perceived need to protect the ingroup from potential cultural threats can 
serve as a key mechanism by which authoritarian predispositions manifest as hostility toward 
immigration. 
 
To examine this, we focus on the extent to which individuals differentiate between types of 
immigration, arguing that this provides additional insight into the role that ingroup protection plays 
in the relationship between RWA and immigration attitudes. We use an original survey of British 
adults that measures hostility towards immigrants of differing regional and skill level backgrounds. 
By more precisely measuring variation in responses to immigrants from these backgrounds, we 
can better understand the cultural and economic concerns behind authoritarianism’s effects on 
immigration attitudes.  
 
We highlight several key findings. First, we illustrate that the differentiation made between low-
versus-high-skilled immigrants is fundamentally distinct from the differentiation made across 
geographic origins. While respondents are broadly hostile towards low-skill immigration, those 
who differentiate the most between immigrants by origin are most strongly against immigration 
overall. Second, we find that RWA has an especially strong effect compared to other individual-
level predictors. In particular, RWA more strongly predicts immigration attitudes than SDO or an 
explicit measure of prejudice. Most importantly, consistent with our argument that cultural threat 
plays a key role in the effects of authoritarianism, we find that RWA is the strongest predictor of 




While RWA is typically used as a single measure, it is made up of three components: aggression, 
submission, and conventionalism (Duckitt et al., 2010; Funke, 2005). To better understand which 
aspects of RWA drive the relationships we see above, we examined the associations between these 
three components and attitudes towards immigration. While each of the components has an effect 
on immigration attitudes in at least some specifications, the most consistent effect comes from the 
aggression component, which focuses on the individual’s emphasis on enforcement of ingroup 
norms. Compared with the other components, aggression predicts higher opposition to low-skilled 
immigration and differentiates more strongly by origin, especially among high-skilled immigrant 
groups. We interpret this finding as supporting the argument that immigration — and especially 
immigration from culturally distant groups — activates authoritarian predispositions to protect the 
ingroup from perceived threats.  
 
These findings have important implications for our understanding of the origins of the anti-
immigrant attitudes associated with support for populist anti-globalization movements. 
Authoritarianism and Immigration Attitudes 
An extensive literature has examined the motivation behind immigration attitudes and the threats 
that motivate hostility to immigration. Studies focused on economic threats have examined income 
levels, sector of occupation, and sector presence in geographic areas, as determinants of hostility 
(e.g., Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; 
Hanson et al., 2001; Sniderman et al., 2004). However, this work finds limited evidence for 
economic vulnerability as a driving cause, instead suggesting that the cultural effects of 




Another strain of research on variation in immigration attitudes has focused on core traits, values, 
personality, and ideology. Such individual-level factors may relate to one’s sensitivity to different 
forms of threat (e.g., Croucher, 2013; Stephan et al., 1998; Stephan et al., 1999). Sensitivity to 
cultural threat is of particular interest, as it may contribute to overall immigration attitudes (Schoon 
and Anderson, 2017). As authoritarianism has been found to be a strong predictor of immigration 
attitudes (Cohrs and Stelzl, 2010; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017), an important question remains as 
to whether these observed associations are driven by sensitivity to cultural threat, with 
authoritarian values directing particular negativity towards groups perceived as threatening to the 
social order. 
 
Measurement of authoritarianism originated with Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and 
Sanford (1950) and was further developed by Altemeyer (1981) with the creation of the ‘right-
wing authoritarianism’ (RWA) scale. Although there is some disagreement about how 
authoritarianism should be measured, there is consensus about the general characteristics of this 
trait. Authoritarianism is associated with an inclination towards emphasizing group norms, 
cohesion, and stability over individual needs and desires (Duckitt, 1989; Feldman, 2003).  
 
As RWA captures a predisposition for upholding norms, and immigration can be perceived as a 
threat to the national culture (Newman et al., 2012), it follows that RWA would be associated with 
hostility towards immigration. While RWA has been found to predict intolerance and prejudicial 
views toward outgroups (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Ekehammer et al., 2014; Sibley and Duckitt, 
2008), explicit attitudes of outgroup inferiority are distinct from an emphasis on protecting the 
ingroup from cultural threats. The perceived cultural effects of immigration are therefore likely to 
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be important to this trait, and thus RWA should be especially associated with negative attitudes 
toward immigration from culturally distant groups.  
 
Another trait suggested as a predictor of immigration attitudes is ‘social dominance orientation’ 
(SDO), designed to capture acceptance of hierarchy and the legitimacy of the dominant group 
(Henry et al., 2005). It has been used in recent research on the rise of populism, such as by Mutz 
(2018), as a measure of status threat to explain Donald Trump’s support in the US. Like RWA, 
SDO also influences prejudicial views (Danso et al., 2007; Sibley and Duckitt, 2008; Thomsen et 
al., 2008). 
 
Previous work, however, shows that the two measures differ in their relation to prejudice and 
immigration hostility. Duckitt and Sibley (2010) show, for example, that RWA’s relationship with 
immigration attitudes is particularly sensitive to differences in cultural values, as well as perceived 
threats, such as crime or terrorism. In contrast, these authors find that SDO, with its emphasis on 
group equality, was predictive of concerns about immigrants with lower economic status. 
Thomson et al. (2008) show that RWA predicts hostility towards immigrants who do not assimilate 
into the majority culture. SDO, they find, predicts hostility towards immigrants who do assimilate, 
as this blurs group boundaries.  
 
In the next section, we describe the survey we use to examine the impact of RWA and other 
individual characteristics on attitudes toward immigration types differentiated by cultural and 




Measuring anti-immigrant attitudes  
To better understand the relationships between immigration attitudes and individual traits, we 
surveyed a sample of 1,102 British respondents.1 We sought to balance both party affiliation and 
support for the Brexit referendum: 29 percent of our sample affiliated with the Conservative party, 
33 percent with Labour, 20 percent did not declare any affiliation, and the remaining respondents 
were distributed among other parties. Of those in our sample who voted in the EU referendum, 
approximately 50 percent voted Remain and 50 percent Leave. The sample is 55 percent female 
and 45 percent male, with 46 percent having a university education or higher. 
 
To measure economic and cultural immigration concerns, we asked our respondents to indicate 
their desire to change immigration levels from groups that vary in skill level and geographic origin. 
By probing our respondents on a range of immigration types, we can better isolate the importance 
of economic and cultural factors to preferences for changes to immigration levels. We created a 
grid of choices based on skill level and regional origin, and our analysis below is based on the 
responses to the high-skilled and low-skilled grids. Existing research has assessed and contrasted 
attitudes towards immigrants based on these skill levels, as they may differ due to, for instance, 
potential labor competition, concerns such as burdening the public services, or beliefs about the 
economic benefits of immigrants with needed expertise (e.g., Facchini and Mayda, 2009; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). 
 
                                               
1 Respondents were recruited through Prolific Academic, using the Qualtrics survey platform. In return for 
completing our survey, participants received a payment of £3.5. 
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Within each skill level grid, the participants stated whether they preferred more, less, or the current 
number of immigrants from several geographic origins across which individuals are likely to have 
different attitudes. The survey captures a range of possible perceptions via categories for ‘Western 
European,’ ‘Muslim,’ ‘Commonwealth,’ ‘Eastern European,’ ‘East Asian,’ and ‘Sub-Saharan 
African’ countries. Previous research suggests that Western Europe is likely to be seen as among 
the least culturally distant origins for immigration (Dustmann and Preston, 2007), while perceived 
cultural distance is likely greater for immigrants from Muslim countries (Richardson, 2004). In a 
recent analysis, Ford (2011: 1033) shows that attitudes toward immigrants in the UK are 
consistently more favorable when countries of origin are associated with white immigrants and 
have “stronger economic, cultural and political links to Britain.” Our categories overlap in this 
regard — with The Commonwealth, for instance, encompassing multiple categories — but overall 
grant us variation in perceptions of cultural and ethnic differences for immigrant groups. 
Additionally, individual immigrant groups may differ in their perceived threat. Hellwig and Sinno 
(2017) find, for instance, that Muslim immigrants to the UK are seen to pose greater security and 
cultural threats, whereas respondents associated Eastern European immigrants more with crime 
and adverse economic impacts.  
 
To generate a measure of the respondents’ overall attitudes towards immigration, we also asked 
them to place themselves on a scale from “fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration” to 
“fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration.”  
 
Figure 1 describes the respondent sample in terms of their preference to increase, decrease, or 
maintain the current number of high- and low-skilled immigrants from different regions. For the 
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high-skill category, few respondents want to decrease immigration levels from any group, and 
substantial numbers prefer to increase immigration. The pattern is reversed for low-skilled 
immigrants, with a very large amount wanting to decrease immigration levels and very few 
wanting an increase. In both skill level categories, a large proportion prefers to maintain the current 
levels. 
 
There is also a clear pattern regarding immigrants of different origins, with some groups 
consistently favored relative to others. Western European and Commonwealth immigrants are 
most favored on average, while Muslim and African immigrants are least favored. However, this 
variation is smaller than the difference between skill levels. The overall pattern of general hostility 
toward low-skill immigration is greater than the variation among different origins. However, our 
purpose is to hold this constant and look within skill levels to determine if differentiation across 













Figure 1: Attitudes towards immigrants of different skill levels and different origins 
 
 
To illustrate the relative impacts of skill and origin differentiation, we calculated measures of how 
much each respondent preferred high-skill or culturally close immigration. To create the measure 
of skill differentiation, we took the difference between the high-skill and low-skill means across 
all origins. To calculate the origin differentiation measure, we took the difference between the 
Western European and Muslim means across skill levels.2 
 
Figure 2 shows the overall measure of immigration attitudes, using the general question on 
attitudes towards restricting immigration, regressed separately on skill differentiation and cultural 
differentiation. This figure shows that an individual’s tendency to discriminate on immigrants’ 
cultural origins correlates positively with overall negative immigration attitudes. The tendency to 
discriminate against immigrants of lower skill levels has a much weaker correlation with overall 
preferences for reduced immigration. On the immigration opposition scale, the difference between 
                                               
2 For purposes of simplicity in this illustration, we exclude several respondents who preferred low-skill or Muslim 
immigration, which allows the scale to begin with the value of those that make no distinction. 
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exhibiting minimum and maximum skill level distinctions is predicted to increase from .57 to .72, 
compared to a difference of .56 to 1.02 between the minimum and maximum origin distinctions.  
 
Figure 2: Opposition to immigration by skill and origin differentiation 
 
Notes: OLS regression with overall immigration attitudes as dependent variable. Shaded regions represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Skill IV represents the difference between the mean of high-skilled immigrant groups and the 
mean of low-skilled immigrant groups. Origin IV represents the difference between the mean of Western European 
immigrants and immigrants from Muslim countries. Higher values on the Y-axis indicate greater opposition to and 
less support of immigration. The scales were min-max transformed, running from 0 to 1.  
 
Measuring RWA and other predictors of immigration attitudes 
In the following sections, we investigate how RWA and other factors correlate with opposition to 
immigration, focusing on the importance the respondents place on differences in skill level and 
geographic origin. To measure RWA, we used a slightly modified version of a 12-item RWA scale 
(Funke, 2005). We took the mean of all responses and then computed a min-max transformation 
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(which we computed for all non-dummy independent variables) (mean = 0.46, sd = 0.17, alpha = 
0.84).  
 
To distinguish the effects of RWA from SDO, we used the 8-item SDO-D scale as well. Here we 
also took the mean of responses (mean = 0.37, sd = 0.21, alpha = 0.88). Although these represent 
different theoretical constructs, we find that RWA and SDO are correlated here at r = 0.55. See 
the online appendix for a full correlation matrix of our dispositional measures. 
 
As immigration attitudes have been linked to prejudicial attitudes, we included a measure of 
explicit prejudice. This allows us to determine whether RWA and SDO may be mediated by 
prejudice or have effects independent of prejudicial beliefs. Furthermore, it is important to 
understand the relative impact of prejudice compared to these other traits. We created a scale made 
up of the mean of three items used by the European Social Survey to capture explicit prejudicial 
beliefs (mean = 0.33, sd = 0.25, alpha = 0.76). The items included are: ‘Some races or ethnic 
groups are born less intelligent than others,’ ‘Some races or ethnic groups are born harder 
working than others,’ and ‘Some cultures are much better than others.’ 
 
To distinguish the effects of RWA and SDO from general ideological profiles, we included a 
measure of the self-placement of respondents on a ‘left-right’ scale.  While RWA and SDO can 
correlate with this scale (see, e.g., Mirisola et al., 2007), the effects of authoritarian traits on 





We included four controls for respondent demographics: age, gender, income, and university-level 
education (binary). These controls are commonly accounted for in the literature on immigration 
attitudes, with older, male, lower-income, and less educated respondents’ typically more opposed 
to immigration. Each of these also captures elements of respondents’ potential economic 
vulnerability to immigration. 
 
Empirical Analyses 
We first regress overall attitudes towards restricting immigration on our predictor variables, as 
well as demographic control variables. Figure 3 displays predicted values for RWA, SDO, and 
left-right self-placement. The measure of explicit prejudice was excluded from the figure for 
clarity and because its coefficient was insignificant. RWA is by far the strongest predictor of 
support for a restrictive immigration policy. To understand more clearly the relationships between 
these predictors and the specific characteristics of immigrants, we need to disaggregate 
immigration attitudes into attitudes towards specific types of immigrant groups. Specifically, we 










Figure 3: Predicted levels of opposition to immigration by main predictors 
 
Notes: Computed from OLS regression with overall immigration attitudes as the dependent variable and other IVs 
held at their means. Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. Higher values on the Y-axis indicate greater 
opposition to and less support of immigration. All variables were min-max transformed, running from 0 to 1. 
Demographic controls, as well as the measure of prejudice were included in the model. 
 
To examine what factors are most important in determining immigration attitudes related to 
different skill levels and origin regions, we ran individual ordinal logistic regressions for each 
skill-origin combination. Figure 4 (top panel) displays the results for immigrants with low skill 
levels, while Figure 4 (bottom panel) displays the results for immigrants with high skill levels.  
 
Demographic variables are excluded from the coefficient plots, but are included in all models and 
described in the tables within the online appendix. With the exception of age, which correlates 
with opposition to immigration, no demographic variables are statistically significant (at the p < 




Focusing specifically on the ideological and dispositional variables, we see important differences 
between the two skill level conditions. The effect of prejudice is stronger in the high-skill 
condition, while right ideology has a greater effect in the low-skill condition. In both conditions, 
the range of effect sizes for RWA varies widely across immigration origin types. While a 
distinction across origins is present in both low and high skill cases, the difference is much larger 
within the high-skill category. Within that category, we see that RWA has the weakest effect for 
Western European and Commonwealth immigrants, while the effect is strongest for Eastern 
European, Sub-Saharan African, and Muslim immigrants, with East Asian immigrants in between. 
This implies that higher levels of RWA increase the hostility towards Eastern European, Sub-
Saharan African, and Muslim immigrants much more than hostility towards those from Western 






Figure 4: Ordered logit models for low-skill (top) and high-skill (bottom) immigrants
 
 
Notes: Ordered logistic regressions. Coefficient values above zero indicate that an increase in the X-variable is 
correlated with greater opposition to immigration. Regression coefficients are represented by the dots, while 95 percent 
confidence intervals with the horizontal lines. Variables were transformed to be on a min-max scale, where moving 
from zero to one indicates movement from the lowest observed value to the observed highest value for the variable. 




It is noteworthy that these differences exist when controlling for an explicit measure of prejudice 
and that the differing effects of RWA are not based only on ethnic distinctions. The coefficient for 
Eastern European immigrants is comparable to that of sub-Saharan African and Muslim 
immigrants, especially in the high-skill condition.  The effect for Commonwealth origin also tends 
to be comparable to Western Europe, though the prompt made clear that this label encompasses 
countries with predominantly non-European populations, using both Australia and India as 
examples. We interpret this result as consistent with our expectation that RWA’s effect on 
immigration attitudes depends on perceived cultural connections, which may include those 
between the United Kingdom and Commonwealth nations. 
 
We also examined several alternate models (see the online appendix for tables of all models, 
including alternate ones). In the analysis above, we have omitted party dummies from our models 
since party identification is likely to be endogenous to RWA and the other ideological and trait 
variables. If we include party dummies in the models above, we find statistically significant 
relationships (at the p < .05 level) for party support only in the high-skill condition and only for 
UKIP and Conservative supporters. Moreover, all the models without party dummies have better 
fit in the low-skill condition according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). In the high-skill 
condition, most models have a better fit with party dummies included, but the differences are not 
substantial. Overall, the effects of party identification cannot be easily distinguished from the 
values behind these affiliations, and so those results should be read with caution. Nevertheless, the 
separate effects of party affiliation are sufficiently small such that including party dummies in our 




As the ideological and trait variables (SDO, RWA, prejudice, and left-right) are partly interrelated, 
we also investigated whether these are more consequential in the absence of the others. Therefore, 
we examine models with the demographic variables and each ideological or trait variable 
separately. In all cases, these variables are statistically significant and their effect sizes are larger 
than in the main models. In addition, the other variables also exhibit some degree of the ordering 
for origin-based effects seen above for RWA, with larger differences in the high-skill condition. 
However, with this approach, RWA still demonstrates the strongest effect overall and the greatest 
differentiation based on origin. These findings suggest that some of the apparent effects of SDO, 
prejudice, and left-right self-placement derive from variance shared with authoritarian traits within 
RWA. Additionally, when SDO is included without other ideological and trait variables, there are 
only modest and inconsistent differences between the two skill level conditions. Thus, we do not 
find support for the contention that SDO has a particularly strong impact on attitudes toward low-
skilled immigration. 
 
As there are three ordinal choices for each type of immigration — increase, decrease, stay the same 
— we can distinguish more precisely the predicted effects for each level. Figure 5 focuses on the 
two most distinct types of immigrant groups in the results above, immigrants from Western Europe 
and immigrants from Muslim countries, and compares the effects of RWA in both the high-skilled 
and low-skilled conditions for each.  
 
Looking at the two low-skill populations, we see that the Western Europe and Muslim Country 
patterns are similar. Even among those low in RWA, few wish to increase low-skilled immigration, 
and most wish to keep levels the same. However, as the level of RWA increases, ‘stay the same’ 
 
 20 
responses decrease in probability, while ‘decrease’ responses become more likely. The difference 
between ‘stay the same’ and ‘decrease’ is larger when the immigrant population comes from 
Muslim countries. At the highest level of RWA, the probability of wanting to decrease low-skill 
Muslim immigration is around 87 percent, while it is around 68 percent for Western European 
low-skilled immigrants. These two plots corroborate the earlier results. Even low-RWA 
individuals are strongly opposed to low-skilled immigration, and as a result, the room for 
differentiation between origin is smaller for high-RWA individuals. That said, we do see that high 
levels of RWA greatly increase the likelihood one will wish to decrease the level of low-skilled 
immigrants, regardless of origin. Although respondents overall have negative attitudes toward low-












Figure 5: Detailed predicted probabilities for desired levels of four immigrant groups 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities for each desired immigration level response. Computed from ordinal logistic 
regressions, with all other variables held at their means.  
 
While the two low-skilled cases show a very similar pattern, the two high-skill cases diverge 
substantially. For high-skilled Western European immigrants, even at a very high level of RWA, 
few wish to decrease immigration. Increasing RWA is associated with a lower probability of 
support for increasing immigration and a greater probability of supporting ‘stay the same.’ If the 
high-skilled immigrants come from Muslim countries, the pattern is very different. As RWA 
increases past its midpoint, both ‘stay the same’ and ‘increase’ responses become less and less 
likely, while ‘decrease’ becomes most likely. At the highest RWA level, there is almost a 64 
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percent probability that a respondent would prefer to decrease high-skilled immigration if it 
originates from a Muslim country. In contrast, there is only about a 17 percent probability of 
preferring to decrease immigration from Western Europe. Thus, while high levels of RWA predict 
an overall hostility towards immigration, it is at high skill levels that we observe the strongest 
effects of origin. 
Analyzing the impact of dimensions of RWA 
The above sections have demonstrated the importance of RWA for immigration attitudes.  The 
RWA measure, however, encompasses several different components. Though the scale was 
originally designed to be unidimensional, with the items capturing multiple components, the 
measure can be disaggregated to understand better which aspects of authoritarianism are behind 
phenomena of interest (Funke, 2005)—in this case, the relationship between RWA and 
immigration attitudes. 
 
Here we examine the RWA scale’s three components: ‘aggression,’ ‘conventionalism,’ and 
‘submission.’ The aggression dimension taps into aggressive and punitive attitudes towards rule-
breakers, deviants, and outgroups. It focuses on whether the individual believes that society needs 
tougher government and stricter laws. Conventionalism instead taps into traditional values and 
gauges beliefs about whether people should adhere to societal norms, for example, focusing on 
sex, marriage, and drugs. The submission dimension focuses on beliefs about whether individuals 
should submit to legitimate authorities and the importance of children learning obedience 
(Altemeyer, 1996; see also Funke, 2005). These three dimensions are associated with distinct 




We computed scales using the items for RWA’s three components, following Funke (2005).3 
Below, in Figure 6, we replicate the models in Figure 4, substituting the individual components 
for the full RWA scale. Although the components are only moderately correlated (aggression and 
conventionalism: r = 0.49, aggression and submission: r = 0.61, conventionalism and submission: 
r = 0.66), each component is included separately to capture both their individual characteristics 
and any variance shared between these components. We also provide a model including all 
components simultaneously in the online appendix, along with a discussion of the differences 
between the two sets of findings.  
 
In the low-skill condition, we see a similar ordering of coefficient magnitudes for both aggression 
and conventionalism, representing a preference for culturally closer immigrant groups. However, 
with conventionalism, only half of the coefficients are statistically significant. Aggression is by 
far the strongest predictor here, and while the origin differentiation is present, this is much weaker 
than in the high-skill condition, as with the main RWA results. Submission shows significant 
relationships for all origin groups, contributing to a general opposition towards low-skill 
immigration, yet with no differentiation between the origins.  
 
In the high-skill condition, we see that all three RWA components are associated with opposition 
to immigration from all groups. The submission component does not strongly differentiate between 
origins and does not present a preference order in line with the overall RWA scale ordering, as in 
the low-skill condition. Again, both conventionalism and aggression display differentiation on 
origin, with the effect for aggression slightly clearer than that present when using the overall RWA 
                                               
3 Cronbach's alphas for the components are: aggression (alpha = 0.75), conventionalism (alpha = 0.65), and 
submission (alpha = 0.62). 
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scale. Whereas conventionalism captures elements of attachment to societal norms, aggression 
focuses on the enforcement of those norms. That aggression is a strong predictor of origin 
differentiation is consistent with an emphasis on protecting the ingroup from cultural threats, given 
the association between this component and punitiveness towards rule-breakers and outgroups. 
The differentiation present for conventionalism indicates that traditional beliefs and attitudes are 
also relevant to preferences for immigrants by origin. Submission, which is related to obedience 
towards legitimate authorities, is consistently associated with opposition to immigration, but this 
does not vary by origin, perhaps due to a weaker emphasis on norm adherence in that component. 
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Figure 6: Ordered logit models with RWA components 
 
Notes: Regression models include demographic controls as well as the other ideological and dispositional variables, 
with one of the RWA components included. Here, only the RWA component coefficients are displayed, with 95 
percent confidence intervals. Coefficient values above zero indicate that an increase in the X-variable is correlated 
with greater opposition to immigration. Variables are standardized to be on a min-max scale, where moving from zero 
to one indicates movement from the lowest to the highest value.  
 
These findings indicate that the origin differentiation seen for RWA in the main analysis above is 
largely driven by the aggression component, albeit with strong support from conventionalism. 
Only aggression, similar to the overall RWA scale, strongly predicts opposition to low-skill 
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immigration. Here we see that conventionalism has the weakest effect. This contrasts with the 
high-skill condition, where all the components display strong associations with immigration 
opposition. On the whole, while these findings reinforce the value of the overall RWA measure, 
aggression captures a threat sensitivity to both culturally distant immigrants and low-skill 
immigrants not seen in the effects of the other components. The alternate results shown in the 
online appendix, with all components included in the same model, further support this finding. 
 
As we argue that individuals are likely more hostile towards immigration when they are 
predisposed to protect ingroup norms, the effect of the aggression facet of RWA is especially 
important. That the component most tied to enforcing norms and punishing rule-breakers is 
particularly associated with overall opposition to immigration as well as a preference for culturally 
similar immigrant groups supports our overall interpretation of the effects of RWA. 
 
Conclusion 
Understanding the sources of immigration attitudes has become especially important for 
understanding the changes taking place in many Western societies, including phenomena such as 
the UK’s Brexit referendum and the rise of populist anti-globalization movements. In this study, 
based on an original survey of UK citizens, we found support for the central role of 
authoritarianism in this dynamic. In predicting attitudes towards immigration, a common 
operationalization of this trait, ‘right-wing authoritarianism’ (RWA), has a far stronger substantive 





Most importantly, by separately measuring immigration preferences by different origin and skill 
levels, we can better understand the effects of RWA on immigration attitudes. This approach 
provides an insight into what aspects of immigration are causing a negative response from 
individuals high in authoritarianism. Not only does RWA strongly predict differences in overall 
attitudes towards immigrants, but the origins of immigrants — most notably Western Europe and 
Commonwealth compared to Muslim majority and African countries — are differentiated in the 
effects of RWA. We interpret this as consistent with the notion that RWA captures a sensitivity 
toward threats from a perceived cultural distance. That the diverse origin category of 
“Commonwealth” is perceived as similar to “Western Europe” suggests a need to separate further 
the types of cultural affinities that mitigate opposition to immigration.  
 
Our findings are also important in light of the extant literature. In their seminal piece, Hainmueller 
and Hopkins (2015) found a “hidden American consensus” on immigration in the US, with very 
strong agreement on the type of immigrant favored by Americans and little variation due to 
education levels or party leanings. Although our results in the UK are consistent with this — we 
confirm that education levels and partisan leanings only weakly explain attitudes towards different 
immigrant groups — the strength of preferences varies substantially and systematically with levels 
of authoritarianism. Individuals exhibiting higher RWA, for whom protecting ingroup norms is 
crucial, are especially hostile towards those with culturally distant origins. We find, for example, 
that an individual at the lowest levels of RWA would have almost a 60 percent probability of 
choosing to increase numbers of high-skilled immigrants from Muslim countries, while those at 
the highest levels of RWA have virtually no probability of holding this preference. Even if we 
assumed that individuals with high and low authoritarian predispositions share preferences for the 
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ideal immigrant, the preferred immigration levels from specific immigrant groups vary 
dramatically between these groups.  
  
Although research has shown that SDO’s effect is likely triggered by low-skill immigration 
(Duckitt and Sibley, 2010), we do not find strong differentiation in its effect by skill level. Even 
when RWA is not present in the model, there are small and inconsistent differences in the effects 
between the two skill levels for SDO. Thus, our findings within this sample do not add support to 
the notion that SDO is capturing a unique feature of immigration attitudes. 
 
Examining the different components of RWA, we gain a further understanding of how 
authoritarianism relates to immigration concerns. While all components contribute similarly to 
overall hostility towards high-skill immigrants, the aggression component was most strongly 
predictive of overall hostility towards low-skill immigrants. We additionally find that aggression 
is the largest factor in discrimination between origins, although conventionalism also plays an 
important role. The findings for aggression, however, suggest that the enforcement aspect of 
authoritarianism is important for both overall immigration attitudes as well as preferences for 
culturally similar immigrants. We interpret this as support for the argument that the connection 
between authoritarianism and immigration is driven by traits associated with an emphasis on 
enforcement of ingroup norms. As the components of right-wing authoritarianism seem to differ 
in their relationship to immigration hostility, future research is needed to further refine 




Given the high intercorrelations between these components, it is important to interpret these 
findings with caution. While we argue that these findings help explain why RWA is associated 
with opposition to immigration, they also indicate that the aggregate measure is important. Our 
results do not suggest that components can be excluded, nor that only the aggression component 
should receive attention. Rather, our interpretation is that opposition to immigration and 
differentiation by origin are associated with adherence to norms, with the clearest effects present 
for aspects of authoritarianism emphasizing enforcement of norms. Future research into improved 
and more precise methods of measuring authoritarianism and its components will illuminate the 
contexts in which these traits most predict immigration hostility.  
 
Another avenue for future research would be to examine the robustness of these findings using 
alternative ways of measuring immigration attitudes. A potential limitation of our study is that 
certain measures are likely to be influenced by social desirability bias. Some studies have shown 
that, for example, there are “distorting effects of real or perceived pressures to give a socially 
desirable response in surveys on attitudes towards African Americans and race-related issues” 
(Janus, 2010: 930). Studies have also shown that such social desirability bias is correlated with 
features such as educational attainment and political ideology, with highly educated individuals 
and liberals being more likely to conceal racially conservative views (see, e.g., Gilens et al., 1998). 
If low-RWA respondents are more likely to conceal their anti-immigrant preferences or are more 
likely to want to appear as though they do not differentiate between immigrants by origin, the 
results may be biased. Given the potential effects of social desirability bias in surveys of 
immigration attitudes, experimental research is needed to manipulate whether respondents are 
exposed to a more culturally familiar or distant immigrant group. This approach is used by 
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Claassen and McLaren (2020), who find results in line with ours, that authoritarian predispositions 
tend to become activated with culturally distinctive immigrant groups. They found, moreover, that 
this effect was particularly strong when respondents were confronted with immigrants originating 
from Muslim majority countries.  
 
Finally, our findings are relevant to recent work emphasizing a shift in political dynamics in 
Western countries from an economic left-right division to one based more on divisions regarding 
authoritarianism (Dalton, 2018; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009; Scotto et al., 2018; Surridge, 
2018). The connection to immigration as a cultural threat illuminates one pathway for how 
authoritarianism may contribute to the modern globalization divide facing many Western 
democracies. Hence, our findings illuminate which individuals are more likely to perceive 
immigration as a cultural threat, contributing to our understanding of how societies become less 
cohesive socially and politically due to globalization. These findings are also consistent with work 
focused on the broader impacts of globalization and economic crises on immigration attitudes (e.g., 
Kuntz et al., 2017; Rodrik, 2018). If economic disruption and high immigration levels provoke a 
backlash, our work contributes to explaining who is likely to react most negatively to immigration 
and the forms of immigration to which they may react. 
 
One of the main challenges facing democratic societies of today is an increased “affective 
polarization” between groups, where supporters of one group or party are severely biased against, 
and may even hate, supporters of another group or party (see, e.g., Iyengar et al., 2019; Mason, 
2018). Such animosity between groups is likely driven by especially salient and moralized issues 
(Garrett and Bankert, 2020), which may be the case for perceived cultural threats associated with 
 
 31 
immigration. As polarization has been associated with political violence and democratic 
backsliding (e.g., Svolik, 2019), it is crucial that we better understand how authoritarian traits 
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